Eruvin 67 – Knowledge vs Dialectics

Continued discussion of shared courtyards and neglected preparations for the Sabbath. Also the status of a rock in the sea – where and how Sabbath restrictions apply. But I focus on some fascinating insights into the friendly rivalries of the Rabbis, and on the objections of students:

Whenever R. Hisda and R. Shesheth met each other, the lips of the former trembled at the latter's extensive knowledge of Mishnahs, while the latter trembled all over his body at the former's keen dialectics.

What matter most, the ability to memorize broadly and quickly recall information, or the ability to deeply analyze and challenge interpretations? Each believed it was the other's gift most treasured.

Again, as we saw on an earlier page, the relationship of student and master is brought up – when and how does a student question his master? A story is told:

There was once a child whose warm water (prepared for the circumcision) was spilled (on the Sabbath)

‘Let some warm water’, said Rabbah ‘be brought for him from my house’ (in the same courtyard). ‘But’, observed Abaye, ‘We have prepared no ‘erub’. ‘Let us then rely’, the other replied. ‘on the shittuf’ (“association” or shared set aside meal). ‘But’, Abaye told him, ‘we had no shittuf either’. ‘Then’, the other said: ‘let a gentile be instructed to bring it for him’ —

‘l wished’, Abaye later remarked: ‘to point out an objection against the Master (questioning whether this instruction to the non-Jew was permitted) but R. Joseph prevented me, because he told me in the name of R. Kahana, "When we were at Rab Judah's he used to tell us that in a Pentateuchal matter any objection must be raised before the Master's ruling is acted upon. But in a Rabbinical matter we must first act on the ruling of the Master and then point out the objection"’.

Eruvin 66 – Renunciation

The page continues a discussion started on the prior dealing with the ability of one person to renounce their share in an eruv in order to allow someone who shared their courtyard but had forgotten and place an eruv meal to still participate in the relaxing of restrictions. If you think that sentence is complicated, the conversations around this are even more so. For example where there is an inner and an outer courtyard – who has a share in which? And if part of the area contains a ruin, which would not normally be considered a “dwelling” – what then?

a ruling of his Master Samuel who laid down: Wherever tenants impose restrictions upon one another but may join together in an ‘erub they may renounce their rights to their shares in favour of one of them; where they may join in an ‘erub but do not impose restrictions upon one another, or when they do impose restrictions upon one another but may not join in an ‘erub, they may not renounce their rights in favour of one of them.

Contradicted (or at least constrained) by

Samuel said that ‘no domain may be renounced where two courtyards are involved nor may it be renounced in the case of a ruin’

Perhaps understood by

Abaye stated: Samuel's ruling that ‘no domain may be renounced where two courtyards are involved’ applies only to two courtyards that had one door in common but where two courtyards were one within the other, since the tenants impose restrictions upon one another, they may also renounce their rights.

In any case, the goal here is to allow a relaxing of restrictions whenever possible.

Eruvin 65 – Character

A classic statement of character:

R. Ila'i said: By three things may a person's character be determined: By his cup,(koso) by his purse (kiso) and by his anger (kaso); and some say: By his laughter (sachko) also.

The Hebrew alliteration works to hold this epigram together. But there is great truth there as well. How one handles drink, i.e. moderation or excess and attitude when constraints are lifted; how one deals with money especially charitable giving; how one relates to others even in anger; and the ability to laugh, even at one’s self; all tell us the truth about a person’s character.

Eruvin 64 – Intoxicated Rabbis

Little commentary needed here. The rabbis say it all:

Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: He who has drunk a quarter of a log of wine must not give a legal decision. This ruling’ observed R. Nahman, ‘is not a very fine one, because in my own case, before I drink a quarter of a log of wine my mind is not clear’.

Ha!

Said Raba to him: Why did the Master speak in such a manner? Did not R. Aha b. Hanina in fact state, ‘What is the exposition of the Scriptural text: But he that keepeth company with harlots (zonah) loses his substance? (Prov. 29:3) Whosoever says: "This ruling is a fine one” (zoh na) or "That ruling is not a fine one" loses the substance of the Torah’ — ‘I withdraw’, the other replied.

See, that was a pun. Right? No? Ok, moving on. . .

Rabbah son of R. Huna ruled: One who is under the influence of drink must not pray, but if he did pray his prayer is regarded as a proper one. An intoxicated man must not pray, and if he did pray his prayer is an abomination.

How do we tell the difference? I'm glad you asked:

How are we to understand the expression of ‘One who is under the influence of drink’, and how that of ‘an intoxicated man’? — As follows. When R. Abbab. Shumani and R. Menashya b. Jeremiah of Difti were taking leave from each other at the ford of the river Yopati they suggested, ‘Let each one of us say something that the other has never heard before, for Mari son of R. Huna laid down: The best form of taking leave of a friend is to tell him a point of the halachah, because he would remember him for it’. ‘What is to be understood’, one of them began, ‘by "one who is under the influence of drink" and what by "an intoxicated man"? The former is one who is able to speak in the presence of a king, the latter is one who is unable to speak in the presence of a king’.

Eruvin 63 – Respect the Master

The relationship between Master and Student is examined. It is considered rude for a student to give a ruling on Jewish law in his Master’s presence. More than rude, actually:

Raba ruled: In the presence of one's Master it is forbidden [to give a legal decision] under the penalty of death;

This is death at the “hands of Heaven.” Still, not very pleasant. But what happens if the Master is not around?

in his absence this is forbidden but the penalty of death is not incurred.

So it is, when one lives in the vicinity of the Master, it is wrong to give rulings. That is there should not be two competing authorities.

Is then no penalty of death incurred in his absence? Was it not in fact taught: R. Eliezer b. Jacob stated: The sons of Aaron died29 only because they gave a legal decision in the presence of their Master Moses.

This is the story of Aaron’s sons Nadav and Abihu who brought “alien fire” to the alter and were struck dead by a fire from Heaven:

What was the exposition they made? And the sons of Aaron the priest shall put fire upon the altar; (Lev. 1:7) although, they said, fire came down from heaven [to light the alter originally](Lev. 9, 24) it is nevertheless a religious duty to bring also some ordinary fire.

What was the sin of Nadav and Abihu according to this reading? Not that they brought the “alien fire” but that they offered a “ruling” (the text says we should ‘put a fire’, not heaven) while their father the High Priest was alive!

Another story:

R. Eliezer, furthermore, had a disciple who once gave a legal decision in his presence. ‘I wonder’, remarked R. Eliezer to his wife, Imma Shalom, ‘whether this man will live through the year’; and he actually did not live through the year. ‘Are you’, she asked him,’a prophet?’ ‘I’, he replied: ‘am neither a prophet for the son of a prophet, but I have this tradition: Whosoever gives a legal decision in the presence of his Master incurs the penalty of death’.

More details are given about this story and those details are debated. Why are the details even given?

in order that it be not said that the whole story was a fable.

Eruvin 62 – Well Sifted Rulings

The Mishanah on the previous page deals with a Jew and a non-Jew whose adjoining homes share a courtyard. Can the share the non-Jew holds in the courtyard restrict the shabbath movement of the Jew?

IF A MAN LIVES IN A COURTYARD WITH A HEATHEN OR WITH ONE WHO DOES NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRINCIPLE OF ERUB, EITHER OF THEM CAUSES HIM TO BE RESTRICTED IN THE USE OF THE COURTYARD. R. ELIEZER B. JACOB RULED: NEITHER CAN RESTRICT HIM UNLESS THERE ARE TWO ISRAELITES WHO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS UPON EACH OTHER.

There is a lot of discussion on this point, about the legal validity of a shared eruv where one party does not share it. And is R. Eliezer b. Jacob right or wrong? Perhaps it hinges on what kind of agreement can be made between them? Or perhaps whether the non-Jew is at home at the time or not.

Ultimately, though:

Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: The law (halachah) is in agreement with R. Eliezer b. Jacob; R. Huna stated: The custom (minhag) is in agreement with the ruling of R. Eliezer b. Jacob; while R. Johanan stated: The public act (nahagu) in agreement with the ruling of R. Eliezer b. Jacob.

The difference being who widely promulgated the ruling is. Halachah can be taught publicly. Minhag is taught privately. Nahagu is not taught, but anyone who practices it is allowed to.

Quite a difference!

Said Abaye to R. Joseph: We have a tradition, that ‘the teaching of R. Eliezer b. Jacob is small in quantity but well sifted.’

I like that analogy – the law is not written or invented, it is “sifted” from the all the excess.

Eruvin 61 – A Tale of Two Towns

The Mishnah describes two towns, a large one and small one, situated within each’s Sabbath boundary. But because the inhabitants of a large town how the limits of their town as part of their boundary, there are circumstances where they can travel throughout the small town, but the small town inhabitant can only travel to the extent of the Sabbath boundary which could terminate anywhere – even in the middle of the large town.

This gets into some two town rivalries, which might get a bit uncivilized. Having previously ruled that:

R. Joseph citing Rami b. Abba who had it from R. Huna ruled: If a town was situated on the edge of a ravine, and there was a barrier four cubits in height in front of it, its Sabbath limit is measured from the edge of the ravine, otherwise measuring must begin from the door of every inhabitant's house.

Rabbi permitted the inhabitants of Gader to go down (on the Sabbath) to Hamethan but did not allow the inhabitants of Hamethan to go up to Gader. Now what could have been the reason? Obviously, that the former did put up a barrier while the latter did not put up a barrier.

Ok, this might be a legal explanation. But maybe there is more:

When R. Dimi came (from Palestine) he explained: The people of Gader used to molest the people of Hamethan, and ‘permitted’ meant ordained’.

Ah, now we have a more complicated relationship! Still:

Then why should Sabbath be different from other days? — Because intoxication is not uncommon on such a day.

Sure! Blame it on the drink.

Would they (Gader) not molest them (Hamethan) when they come there? (to Hamethan) — No; a dog in a strange town does not bark for seven years.

Nice expression.

Now then, might not the people of Hamethan molest those of Gader? — No; they (Gader) were not so submissive as all that.

And would defend themselves. This feels like two towns with rival football teams! Go Gaders! (Hamethan better come up with a better team name. “Hamethan Hams” just isn’t going to work.)