Eruvin 73 – Big Love

“Family” definition of private space is brought up in the Mishnah

BROTHERS WHO WERE EATING AT THEIR FATHER'S TABLE BUT SLEPT IN THEIR OWN HOUSES MUST EACH CONTRIBUTE A SHARE TO THE ‘ERUB

The overall question is: does the definition of a private domain come from where one sleeps or where one eats? This is seen in a courtyard shared by several people who all are maintained by the same person:

Our Rabbis taught: Where a man has five wives who are in receipt of a maintenance allowance from their husband or five slaves who are in receipt of a maintenance allowance from their Master, R. Judah b. Bathyra permits [unrestricted movement] in the case of the wives but forbids it in the case of the slaves, while R. Judah b. Baba permits this in the case of slaves but forbids it in the case of the wives.

Said Rab, what is R. Judah b. Baba's reason? The fact that it is written in Scripture: But Daniel was in the gate of the king. (Dan. 2:49)

That is, wherever the kings servant went he was still “in the gate of the king”, that is – the king’s house.

The question of measuring Shabbat distance comes up for laborers who take their meals in the city but sleep in the fields, or students who eat in the country but sleep in the schoolhouse. They would, it was concluded, “much prefer” to have taken their meals where they slept (schoolhouse or field).

Eruvin – Great Hall

MISHNAH. IF FIVE COMPANIES SPENT THE SABBATH IN ONE HALL EACH COMPANY, BETH SHAMMAI RULED, MUST CONTRIBUTE SEPARATELY TO THE ERUB; BUT BETH HILLEL RULED: ALL OF THEM CONTRIBUTE TO THE ‘ERUB ONLY ONE SHARE.

THEY AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT WHERE SOME OF THEM OCCUPY ROOMS OR UPPER CHAMBERS A SEPARATE CONTRIBUTION TO THE ‘ERUB MUST BE MADE FOR EACH COMPANY.

The Hall described is a kind of hotel, where each room is part of the whole but has its own partitions and door out to the courtyard.

The dispute between Hillel and Shammai is unclear and is discussed thoughout the page. Is it a question of the size of partition for each room? R. Nachaman imagines the partitions as being mere stakes in the floor. R. Hiyya and R. Simeon imagine the difference between partitions which reach almost, but not quite, to the ceiling.

Is the contribution one for each room, or one for each individual? Or is this an issue of transfer?

A Tanna taught: This applies only where their ‘erub is carried into a place other [than the hall]. But if their ‘erub is remaining with them all agree that one contribution to the ‘erub suffices for all of them.

This is seen as Hillel’s position.

Others read: This applies only where the ‘erub remained with them, but if they carried their ‘erub to a place other [than their hall] all agree that a separate contribution to the ‘erub is required for each company.

 Whose view is followed in which was taught: If five residents who collected their contributions to an ‘erub desired to transfer it to another place one ‘erub suffices for all of them? — Whose view? No one's.

Let’s hear it for “no one” !

Eruvin 71 - Bererah and Shittuf

To create a space outside the home, like a courtyard, which can be considered part of ones private space for Shabbat, one needs to set aside a food item, representing a meal, in that space. Normally this is not so difficult. But there are times when designating a set-aside item to identify an owned space can be complicated. Two concepts are discussed.


Bererah or "joint ownership" holds when there are multiple owners of a cask of wine, for example. That ownership alone is needed, rather than designating, is shown. But with bererah there is disagreement. That a cask of wine is sufficient, is agreed by the rabbis. But. . .

They only differ where the householders bought a cask of wine in partnership. R. Eleazar b. Taddai is of the opinion that there is no such rule as bererah while the Rabbis maintain that the rule of bererah holds good.

There is another concept of shittuf or "association." By virtue of this association perhaps no meal need be set aside at all.

R. Joseph explained: R. Eleazar b. Taddai and the Rabbis differ on the question whether it is permissible to rely upon shittuf where an ‘erub is required. The one Master holding that It is not permissible to rely on it while the Masters maintain that it is permissible to rely on it.

This term, shittuf, becomes complicated in post-Talmudic literature as dealing with the question of non-Jews who are monotheists - for example Christians who "associate" the name of Jesus when mentioning G-d. The commentators have generally not considered their vow idolatry. Although this is a concept which has caused some confusion, that is not the discussion in the Talmud.

Eruvin 70 – Continuity Throughout Shabbat

The rule of the shared eruv and the ability of one party to renounce his share of the prepared meal in favor of one who had forgotten to create a share is continued in some detail. But one greater principle is held out:

This is the general rule: Whatever is permitted during a part of the Sabbath remains permitted throughout the Sabbath and whatever is forbidden during a part of the Sabbath remains forbidden throughout the Sabbath, the only exception being the case of the man who renounced his share.

So what does the first part mean?

‘Whatever is permitted during a part of the Sabbath remains permitted throughout the Sabbath’, as is, for instance, the case of an eruv that was prepared for the purpose of carrying objects through a certain door and that door was closed up, or one that was prepared for the purpose of carrying objects through a certain window and that window was closed up.

That is, if an eruv is prepared say between two courtyards and the connection between those two courtyards collapses on Shabbat, the eruv remains intact through the Shabbat. For example, one could throw an object from one courtyard to another or pass things through a hole – both only permitted within an intact eruv.

 ‘Whatever is forbidden during a part of the Sabbath remains forbidden throughout the Sabbath’, as, for instance, in the case of two houses, that were respectively situated on the two sides of a public domain which gentiles surrounded with a wall during the Sabbath. What does the expression ‘This is the general rule’, include? It includes the case of a gentile who died on the Sabbath.

Perhaps, upon his death during the Sabbath day, the share of the courtyard which was held by a gentile whose possession of it precluded the use by Jews who also shared (all owners of the courtyard have to agree and participate in the eruv or none can) would be opened up. No, because it was forbidden at the beginning of the Sabbath, it remains so throughout.

Now here it was stated: ‘The only exception being the case of the man who renounced his share’, from which it follows, does it not, that only he may do so but not his heir? — Read, ‘The only exception being the law of renunciation’.

Does the exception mentioned mean that if the (Jewish) owner of a share died on the Sabbath and he had neglected to dedicate his share to the eruv, his son who inherits renounce that share of the courtyard during the Sabbath?

Not if the final phrase is read “. . .the case of the man who renounced his share” – his share, not his father’s! But if it is read “. . .the law of renunciation” then it would be allowed. 

Eruvin 69 – Barefaced Charm

The ability to renounce shares in the eruv is a right of Israelites. A Sadducee is mentioned in the Mishnah by R. Gamaliel with the implication that he is in the same status as a gentile in terms of participation in Sabbath law such as the eruv. On the previous page the Sadducee is put in the same category as a Boethusian.

Our page compares an apostate “mumar” with a “barefaced sinner” (galui peh). Are they able to participate in the eruv?

But is a barefaced (beardless?) sinner on a par with a mumar?

How to contrast them? This may have to do with one who desecrates the Sabbath in public verses in private:

R. Huna stated: Who is regarded as an Israelite in mumar? He who desecrates the Sabbath in public. Said R. Nahman to him: In agreement with whose view? If [it be suggested that it is] in agreement with that of R. Meir who holds that a person who is suspected of disregarding one matter [of law] is held suspect in regard to all the Torah, the statement should also apply to any of the other prohibitions of the Torah; and if [it is suggested that it is] in agreement with the view of the Rabbis did they not rule, it may be objected, that one who is suspected of disregarding one law is not held suspected in regard to all the Torah unless he is a mumar in respect of idolatry.

So the assumption that someone who desecrates some laws should in held is suspect of all laws is questioned. Although it is later shown that “idolatry and the desecration of the Sabbath are offences of equal gravity.”

But a case is also brought up:

A certain man once went out (on the Sabbath) with a jewelled charm (“Humarta di-medusha” – maybe a Medusa headed-charm? See Mo’ed Katan 12b) but when he observed R. Judah Nesi'ah he covered it up. ‘A person of this type’, [the Master said.] ‘is in accordance with the view of R. Judah entitled to renounce his share’. (i.e. is considered an Israelite in all respects).

Shame counts!

Eruvin 68 – Superposition

In Quantum Mechanics there is a fundamental principle known as “superposition” in which a discrete item (such as an electron) exists in all possible states (i.e. position, energy level) at once. Once it is observed or measured all the options “collapse” into the one reality.

I was reminded of this by a short aside in the text:

For we learned: If a corpse lay in a house that had many (closed) doors all the doorways (through which the corpse might be carried) are unclean.

If one of them was (standing) open, that doorway is unclean while all the others are clean (since the corpse would be carried through that door.) If it was intended to take out the corpse through one of (the closed doors) . . ., this protects all the (other) doors. 

Beth Shammai ruled: This (rule of intention) applies only where the intention was formed before the person in question was dead, but Beth Hillel ruled: Even if it was formed after he was dead.

All the doors are deemed to be “unclean” until the intention to use them is formed (Beth Shammai before death, Beth Hillel even after), because all routes are possible. Not the action of carrying, but the intention to carry, collapses the multiple possible states into one.

I find that pretty remarkable!

Eruvin 67 – Knowledge vs Dialectics

Continued discussion of shared courtyards and neglected preparations for the Sabbath. Also the status of a rock in the sea – where and how Sabbath restrictions apply. But I focus on some fascinating insights into the friendly rivalries of the Rabbis, and on the objections of students:

Whenever R. Hisda and R. Shesheth met each other, the lips of the former trembled at the latter's extensive knowledge of Mishnahs, while the latter trembled all over his body at the former's keen dialectics.

What matter most, the ability to memorize broadly and quickly recall information, or the ability to deeply analyze and challenge interpretations? Each believed it was the other's gift most treasured.

Again, as we saw on an earlier page, the relationship of student and master is brought up – when and how does a student question his master? A story is told:

There was once a child whose warm water (prepared for the circumcision) was spilled (on the Sabbath)

‘Let some warm water’, said Rabbah ‘be brought for him from my house’ (in the same courtyard). ‘But’, observed Abaye, ‘We have prepared no ‘erub’. ‘Let us then rely’, the other replied. ‘on the shittuf’ (“association” or shared set aside meal). ‘But’, Abaye told him, ‘we had no shittuf either’. ‘Then’, the other said: ‘let a gentile be instructed to bring it for him’ —

‘l wished’, Abaye later remarked: ‘to point out an objection against the Master (questioning whether this instruction to the non-Jew was permitted) but R. Joseph prevented me, because he told me in the name of R. Kahana, "When we were at Rab Judah's he used to tell us that in a Pentateuchal matter any objection must be raised before the Master's ruling is acted upon. But in a Rabbinical matter we must first act on the ruling of the Master and then point out the objection"’.